Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printed page of such transmission.
In the same fashion, [previously established] theorems . . . yield sufficient conditions for an equilibrium relative to price system to be an optimum, and for an optimum to be an equilibrium relative to a price system.5
Formally this is true, but there are differences so fundamental between the certainty and uncertainty economies that the actual significance of the results belies their superficial similarity.
Suppose that consumer choices are made so as to maximize expected utility under budget constraint. The configuration achieved is such that no trader's expected utility can be increased by a redistribution of contingent commodities (contracts deliverable at a certain date and event) without decreasing some trader's expected utility. Such a situation is known as an Arrow optimum, constituting an "optimal allocation of risk bearing." 6 Professor Radner aptly describes the situation as "optimum relative to a given structure of information in the economy." 7 As a practical matter, the achievement of Arrow optimum is a normative dead end. After all, we are not so much interested in expectations as in results. Given an Arrow optimal distribution of contingent claims and supposing the occurrence of some event, we can then ask whether in that event the distribution of real goods resulting from the given distribution of contingent claims is a Pareto optimal distribution of real goods. If the answer is "no," then it is comparatively small comfort to know that the economy had achieved an optimal allocation of risk bearing. If we are interested in satisfactions actually realized rather than those that are merely anticipated, the appropriate quality to-seek is that there be no redistribution that will increase some trader's realized utility while decreasing no trader's realized utility. Such a situation will be termed an ex post Pareto optimum. Depending on the structure of subjective probabilities and on the events that occur, there may be Arrow optima that are not ex post Pareto optima and ex post Pareto optima that are not Arrow optima. A situation is said to be an intratemporal Pareto optimum if there is no feasible redistribution or reallocation of goods all of a single time period and event, 5. Ibid., p. 102. 6. Priority for enunciation of the distinction between ex ante and ex post optimum and for independent discovery of some of the results of section IV in the case of a social welfare function whose arguments are differentiable utility functions is due to Jacques Dreze in "Market Allocation Under Uncertainty" (paper presented at the First outputs of other periods and events remaining fixed, such that some trader is made better off and no trader is made worse off.
II. CONSUMERS AND COMMODITIES
Most of the interesting questions on uncertainty and optimality over time can be meaningfully posed and answered in a two-period model. The effect of considering more periods would be primarily to introduce more complicated and confusing notation. In the first period let there be a unique state of the world known to all traders. Let the conceivable states of the world in the second period comprise the elements of the finite set S.8 Let there be n goods available in each state and period. -Then there are (IS-+1)n commodities (period 1 goods and period 2 contingent commodities) traded ex ante.9
A commodity bundle then is an element of OA, the nonegative orthant of Euclidean (IS+j1)n space. An ex ante price vector is also an element of E(Isl+')n. Eventually realized bundles will be elements of ??p, the nonnegative orthant of Euclidean 2n space (as is an ex post price vector). Traders are elements of the finite'set T. For each tET there is a utility function,' uj(x(tl, x2tj), defined for each jES and for all arguments within some bounded (feasible) 'subset of the nonnegative orthant of E2n. Vs utility function is allowed to vary with the state of the world prevailing in period 2. This reflects the possibility that the satisfaction derived from an umbrella may depend on the weather. I will suppose that utj satisfies Arrow's assumptions 2, 3, and 6.2 These include free disposability and strict concavity.3 This combination has the advantage of assur-8. There are some subtleties in the specification and even the existence of S investigated in Radner, op. cit., and J. with the strict inequality holding for at least one tET.
III. CONSUMER CHOICE AND THE SUBJECTIVITY THEOREM
Given an ex ante price system PE0A, the problem of choice for tET is merely to choose X'EfZA so that xt maximizes t's expected utility subject to budget constraint. If t's choice is xat we know that (13) Etut ( for all tET, with the strict inequality holding for at least one tET. Q.E.D.
The subjectivity theorem asserts that information affects action. If subjective probabilities are not similiar, then information changing them all (to k) will result in changed consumption decisions as well. Q.E.D. Theorem 2 says that, given Arrow optimum, any lack of ex post Pareto optimality that arises under uncertainty over time is not due to nonoptimal distribution of chosen output within a given time and event, but rather comes from misallocation and maldistribution over time or across events. Thus, an economy that has Arrow optimal distribution will appear to have Pareto optimal production and distribution at any point in time. It is only with respect to the choice of present versus future consumption that nonoptimality arises.
IV. NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR Ex POST PARETO OPTIMUM GIVEN ARROW OPTIMUM
Given Arrow optimum, a necessary condition for ex post Pareto optimum is that subjective probabilities for the state that actually occurs should be universally similar.7 THEOREM 3: Let xt, tET, be an Arrow optimum. Let j* be the event that occurs, f (r, j*) >0 for some; rET. A necessary condition for (xtl, xt2j*), tET, to be an ex post Pareto optimum is that subjective probabilities for j* be universally similar. The above theorem is fundamental to understanding how information and subjective probabilities affect optimal allocation under uncertainty. If subjective probabilities for the state that occurs differ significantly (i.e., so that universal similarity does not hold), then ex post misallocation will definitely result. The reason is that ex ante diversity of subjective probabilities implies ex post diversity of marginal rates of substitution of present versus future consumption; equality of these rates is a necessary condition for Pareto optimum.
7. See also Dreze, op. cit.
The corollary points out that if subjective probabilities lack universal similarity for all states of the world, then no matter what state of the world occurs, the resulting distribution will not be an ex post Pareto optimum. This is not to say that there is a redistribution ex ante that will make all traders better off ex post no matter what state of the world takes place. If this were the case, the original allocation would not have been an Arrow optimum since redistribution would have increased all traders' expected utility. Rather, the corollary says that, given sufficient diversity, it is clear that ex post Pareto nonoptimality will result.
If utility functions are differentiable the mathematics of the problem is particularly straightforward. One can rely on the theorem that whenever goods are consumed in nonzero quantities by two traders in a market, a necessary condition for Pareto optimum is that marginal rates of substitution for the two goods be the same for the two traders. Consider a pure exchange economy with one good denoted c. Let the two traders in question be t, r. Then Arrow optimality implies that t's marginal rate of substitution ex ante of a contingent claim due period 2 state j for certain good period 1 must equal r's marginal rate of substitution. Thus, Assume that if (y1, y2)Eyj there is zEY so that zl=yl, z2j=y2. This says nothing more than that no output feasible ex post for given jES is infeasible ex ante. I will also assume 8 that for any yEY there is yjEYj so that yj1 (y', y2j) . That is, one assumes that consideration of several possible events does not increase possible output in any event over what it would be in the case of uncertainty.
An output is said to be efficient if there is no other feasible output that is greater in some component and less in no component. 
VI. EFFICIENCY
In most economies uncertainty has severe implications for the ex post optimality of production decisions. Drought-resistant seeds planted in a year that turns out to have a heavy rainfall will yield a disappointing harvest. Nothing short of good luck or good prediction will alleviate this problem. However, there is a moderately well-defined class of production sets under uncertainty in which producers are not forced to choose between maximal output in one state of the world versus maximal output in the other. One can have both. If production sets are of this form, then there is no particular value to good prediction. Producers can do just as well in ignorance. Conversely, in economies with production sets that are not in this class, there is likely to be substantial value to good prediction.
Productive Theorems 4 and 5 give necessary and sufficient global conditions for ex ante efficiency to imply ex post efficiency. They imply that if an economy's ex ante transformation set is weakly independent with respect to j, knowledge as to whether state j will occur will not enhance productive efficiency. Efficiency considerations provide no reason to investigate whether state j will occur. Conversely, if one knows that the ex ante transformation set is not weakly independent with respect to j, there is reason to believe that productive efficiency will be enhanced by knowledge of whether state j will occur. 
VII. ECONOMIES WHERE THE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR

